Ricardo Lewandowski, appointed by Lula, shields Lula, anticipating Brasilia’s lower court judges, who would re-evaluate evidence of Odebrecht’s bribes for the Lula Institute and an apartment in São Bernardo do Campo, following the arrival of lawsuits from Curitiba to the capital federal.
Kassio Nunes Marques, nominated by Jair Bolsonaro, postpones the judgment of the retroactive privileged jurisdiction of Flavio Bolsonaro, who even receives an award from his father’s government, as does Dias Toffoli, who, in 2019, suspended the investigation into Flávio.
Pocketnarists, when they criticize the STF for shielding Lula, they omit that Nunes Marques collaborated for the PT’s impunity by voting to withdraw Antônio Palocci’s complaint from one of the processes and to validate the judgment of the suspicion of Sergio Moro. Lulistas, when criticizing the STF for shielding Flávio, omit that Toffoli also spared him. And both claques ignore the agreement with the Supreme, with everything, for the general shielding.
Deputies impose a quarantine in the new electoral code for judges and members of the Public Ministry, which, before the negative repercussion, aimed to prevent the candidacy of the former judge of Lava Jato in Curitiba for the presidency of the Republic in 2022 and to keep the system protected against a potential outsider, as Bolsonaro pretended to be, to win in 2018. In theory, however, if it is not changed in the Senate, the quarantine will only be valid from 2026.
If Moro, in turn, announces a pre-candidacy early, he can, on the one hand, boost the union of the old politics to prevent it; on the other, to further open up any possible retaliation. As the system’s revenge on Lava Jato is already wide open (even Eduardo Cunha had a case sent from Curitiba to the Electoral Court of Rio, with votes from Lewandowski and Gilmar Mendes), perhaps Moro prefers to wait in silence until a more opportune moment of national commotion or greater meltdown of Bolsonaro for inflationary reasons, avoiding the wear and tear to which other postulants to the third way are exposed, without engaging a fanatical niche in times of apathy, crisis and crossed rancor.
Michel Temer, back in the spotlight after mediating the alleged pacification conspiracy, keeps a secret about the content of the phone calls between himself, his nominee and protector in the STF Alexandre de Moraes and Bolsonaro, without revealing whether the minister promised directly or indirectly to the president to avoid, for the time being, Carluxo’s arrest in the fake news inquiry or any other containment of damages to the presidential family and its frenzy of mad reactionaries. What is known is that Bolsonaro said he didn’t mind his base’s disapproval of the letter (he never cared about who doesn’t exist without him) and that he promised to continue with a moderate tone.
In addition to the rise in the price of the dollar, gasoline and food, two TSE decisions, the first with a vote by Moraes, also contributed to the president’s fear of stretching the rope in confrontation with higher courts: the confirmation that cracking is something for a thief and renders ineligible, as happened in the case of a former councilor from São Paulo, and the opening of the investigation on the clandestine financing of the September 7th Pocketnaristas acts, since crazy ruralistas were filmed distributing money to the scenic cheerleaders inside by bus and the making of caps and clothes can also configure an early election campaign.
On the other hand, the wing of the financial market and business, which only cares about a supposed stability to package deals in the short term, and/or with its traditional barters with any government, enjoyed the yellowish letter written by Bolsonaro to Moraes and did not see any major problems in the event of Lula’s eventual return to power, after all Lula and Bolsonaro know how to privilege allied companies with funds and other federal advantages, including in the communication market, to the detriment of free and fair competition in the private sector.
There are dissonant voices, however, such as economists Edmar Bacha and Armínio Fraga, former presidents of the BNDES and the Central Bank, respectively. “I’m 100% involved in the search for a better way, because I think Bolsonaro is a risk to Brazil’s democracy and Lula is a risk to the economy,” disse bacha, one of the formulators of the Plano Real. “The latest statements that he, Lula, has made show that he hasn’t learned anything,” he added, citing positions against fiscal austerity and economic opening. Fraga was on the same line: “I hope he doesn’t win and I think it’s time to come up with another alternative. And that would be important, even if he doesn’t, to enrich the debate.”
Both criticize the Bolsonaro government’s abandonment of the liberal agenda and understand, as I have repeated for years, that “the PT in power threw away the best development opportunity that this country has ever had” (Fraga), spending “what it had and what it did not had, instead of increasing the capacity for growth with that huge wave of commodities” (Bacha). Not to mention the lack of self-criticism in Lula in relation to the economy and corruption.
The formation of a third way depends precisely on the cognitive, moral and proactive strength of influential people, capable of overcoming differences and uniting against the deceptive immediacy, crony capitalism and the bovine inertia that characterize the the status quo Brazilian.
There is a silent majority waiting for anyone to catch their attention, but it takes independence and daring to upset the club of the content and face the reactions, pointing out the absolute lack of transparency of the old policy, with the Supreme, with everything.